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C00002 00002	        I would like to raise some issues about the extreme conservation
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        I would like to raise some issues about the extreme conservation
measures that would be required by a sudden, severe and prolonged supply
interruption in liquid fuels.  My reference crisis involves the sudden
reduction of liquid fuel use in the U.S. to one quarter its present value
and lasts until a crash program of production of synthetic fuels, increased 
recovery and substitution by nuclear and coal-generated electricity restores
equilibrium between demand and the new cost of production.  The reason for
supposing liquid fuels to be reduced to one quarter is that we now import
half our liquid fuels, and I assume this production lost.  I further suppose 
that during the crisis we export to our worse off allies half of the liquid fuels
we produce including half of the new production of synthetics as it comes on
line.  I suppose we export half, because that does our allies half the maximum
good we could do; we could not do qualitatively better.
        Such a crisis would disrupt our economy and many workers could not 
continue their jobs.  Conversely, vast manpower, e.g., automobile workers and
college students, would be available to build synthetic fuel production 
facilities, to convert plants to coal and finish the nuclear backlog.  The
crisis would probably be as disruptive as World War II to our economy and last as
long, i.e., four years.
        Ending the crisis in four years by a "production miracle" requires that,
our mobilization for production be as prompt and smooth as our World War II
mobilization.  This requires that our political energies go mainly into enacting 
adequate measures for the mobilization and not into fighting each other.
        This will be difficult but not impossible.  In 1973, each group in society
continued to say what it had been saying all along - only louder.  Here are some
considerations relating to the emergency conservation program.
        1. The initial crisis will hit different parts of the country differently.
Most oil-heated houses may have to be temporarily closed up, children and other
non-workers evacuated to the South and houses near work places temporarily 
converted to rooming houses.
        2.  Some ways of implementing the required combination of rationing and
pricing would exacerbate internal conflicts, and others would mobilize effort to
restore normality.  ↓-The plan-↓should be based on whatever understanding we can 
acquire about which is which.
        3.  Acceptance of hardship requires that restoration of normality be the 
perceived good.
        4.  The level of hardship might be more or less than that endured by
American  civilians in World War II.  It would not approach that endured by 
British, Japanese, German civilians and would be nowhere near that endured in Russia
or occupied Europe.
        5.  It would be good if we could prepare a contingency plan that Congress
could vote on now.  However, this seems unlikely for two reasons;
 
            First, we don't know what the crisis will be like.  On the one hand
            it may be less severe or prolonged and on the other hand, it may 
            involve additional complications like war.
 
            Second, Congress could not pay the political costs, including the 
            breaking of longstanding coalitions and forming new ones, in order
            to decide hypothetical questions.  In particular it would require
            moderates on both sides of present economic and environmental issues
            to break with the extremists who provide their best troops in order       
            to reach a compromise.  The political blood spilled to solve a            
            presently hypothetical issue would be real blood not hypothetical.
 
        6   Nevertheless, some political prepaaration may be possible.  Perhaps 
we could agree on a plan with two undecided parameters.  One parameter would be on
the liberal--conservative political dimension, e.g., the amount of a tax on profits
or the magnitude of an income equalization measure.  The second parameter would be 
on the environment vs. growth axis, e.g., the amount of compromise with 
environmental standards.  Agrement on the parametrized plan might be obtained now,
because, for example, a conservative would be pleased with the plan if only the
liberal-conservative panel came out "right" enough, and the liberal would like the 
plan if it came out sufficiently to the "left."
 
 
        When the crisis came, Congress would fight it out according to the strength
at the time of the contending views and set the values of the parameters.  The
alliances would be broken and reformed and the political blood shed, but less time
would be required than if every detail had to be fought out along liberal-
conservative and environment-growth dimensions.
 
        This idea may be hopelessly naive in its present form, but perhaps some 
elements of it will be found usable.
     
                                          John McCarthy
 
MAIN POINTS
 
  1.  Which measures generate internal cooperation and which conflict.
 
  2.  A plan with open political or ideological parameters.